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ABORIGINAL RIGHTS, ABORIGINAL
CULTURE, AND PROTECTION©
BY GORDON CHRISTIE*
There is a common perception that elements of
mainstream society are disrespectful of Aboriginal
culture.  This article argues that developments in the
law offer promise for the protection of Aboriginal
“intellectual products,” manifestations of Aboriginal
culture reflecting their world-view.  What Aboriginal
peoples would like to see protected, however, are not
so much words, pictures, or acts but rather the values,
beliefs, and principles that give these meaning.  Such,
the author argues, are best protected by mechanisms
internal to Aboriginal communities.  Furthermore, the
lack of such mechanisms would not justify the intrusion
of Canadian law, but rather raises a call within
Aboriginal communities to return to traditional means
of controlling traditional knowledge and culture.  The
challenge will be to fashion these tools to meet
contemporary demands.
Il y a une perception générale que les éléments de la
société dominante sont irrespectueux envers la culture
aborigène. Cet article soutient que des développements
dans la loi promettent la protection de la “production
intellectuelle” aborigène, manifestation de la culture
aborigène reflétant leur vision du monde.  Ce que les
peuples aborigènes aimeraient voir protégé, pourtant,
ce sont moins les mots, les illustrations ou les actes, que
les valeurs, les croyances, et les principes qui leur
donnent un sens.  Tout cela, selon l’auteur, serait mieux
protégé par des mécanismes internes des communautés
aborigènes.  En plus, l’absence de tels mécanismes ne
saurait justifier l’instruction de la loi canadienne, mais
provoquerait plutôt un appel au sein des communautés
aborigènes pour retourner aux moyens traditionnels
pour préserver les connaissances et la culture
traditionnelles.  Le défi serait de façonner ces moyens
pour les adapter aux besoins contemporains.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
One can wander over the landscape of Canadian jurisprudence
without coming across landmarks meant clearly to point the way to an
understanding of the place of Aboriginal cultural property in the legal
framework.  This claim might seem odd, since over the last few years
landmark decisions have come down from the highest court in the land
on the very issues of the nature of, and protection to be accorded to,
Aboriginal rights.  These decisions have been couched in terms of
Aboriginal culture and practice.1
1 In reverse chronology the decisions are: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter Adams]; R. v. Côté,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter Côté]; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van der
Peet]; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v.
Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 [hereinafter Nikal]; R. v. Badger,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow]; and R. v. Sioui, [1990]
1 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafter Sioui].  Leading into, and in some instances informing, the landmark
decisions of recent years are a coterie of cases, including, inter alia: Calder v. British Columbia
(A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313; Baker Lake (Hamlet) v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518 (T.D.) [hereinafter Baker Lake]; and Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
335 [hereinafter Guerin] (in the context of spelling out the legal status of Aboriginal rights these
cases, as important as they are historically, play supporting roles).
While the Delgamuukw decision might seem to be the most far-reaching and visionary of the
recent judgments, it plays only a peripheral role in the discussion in this article.  In this decision the
Court made it quite clear that jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights will fall into two fairly distinct
categories—decisions which focus on Aboriginal rights as they exist more or less independent of
concerns over Aboriginal title to tracts of land, and decisions which focus fairly exclusively on the
question of Aboriginal title.  The split can be read out of the following passage, at 1080:
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the right to engage in specific
activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights.  Rather, it confers the right to use
land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of practices, customs and
traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal societies.  Those
activities do not constitute the right per se; rather they are parasitic on the underlying
title.
The possibility that Aboriginal rights could exist independent of claims to Aboriginal title was
accepted in Van der Peet, at 511, and subsequently adopted in Côté and Adams.
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The apparent oddity begins to be resolved once it is recognized
that, wording aside, these decisions do not actually touch on the
protection of Aboriginal culture, but rather the protection of Aboriginal
activities, such as fishing in particular places, at particular times, by
particular individuals or groups, for particular reasons.2
This sort of protection does not, and is not meant to, address the
issue of the protection of Aboriginal culture, and so does not touch on
the protection of Aboriginal cultural property.  Aboriginal culture finds,
at most, indirect expression in such activities.  If we were to try to locate
direct manifestations of Aboriginal culture we would do much better to
look at such expressive activities as storytelling, music and dance, visual
arts, dramatic presentations, rituals, ceremonies, and—more recently for
indigenous cultures of the world—writing.3  These latter cultural
manifestations we might term the intellectual products of an Aboriginal
people.4
2 To see that the focus in recent decisions has been on Aboriginal activities, note that, by and
large, they concern fishing, hunting, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, gambling.  This pattern can
be accounted for by pointing out that these activities are central to the lives of Aboriginal peoples.
My claim is not that these are not Aboriginal practices integral to the lives of Aboriginal peoples,
but that the courts focus not on their spiritual or cultural foundations in Aboriginal culture, but on
their simply being “traditional” (i.e., long-standing and important) practices, one stamped by, and so
identifiable through, their peculiarly Aboriginal form.  This can be seen from Cory J.’s acceptance in
Nikal, supra note 1 at 1056 (citing R. v. Nikal, [1991] 1 C.N.L.R. 162 at 167 (B.C.S.C.)), of a finding
of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge concerning the description of the right at issue.
The judge below had found that
the [A]boriginal right includes the right to choose the period of time, whether early in the
year when the ice is still in the river, or after the end of August, up to a date in
September, when steelhead are normally taken, the right to select persons intended to be
the recipients of the fish for ultimate consumption, the right to select the purpose for
which the fish is to be used, that is, for food or ceremonial or religious purposes, and the
method or manner of fishing … .
Cory J., at 1057, added one qualification:
[T]he selection of the ultimate recipients of the fish is not an unqualified right.  Rather,
the evidence adduced went no farther than establishing that the appellant as a
Wet’suwet’en had the right to provide to other members of the band those fish that are
necessary for their personal and ceremonial needs.
3 This is not to say that fishing could not be construed in a way that made it culturally
expressive.  But while the courts explore the notion of culturally expressive fishing practices
primarily in terms of “practices” ( i.e., in terms of the use of certain types of nets, with certain
techniques, at certain times of the year, etc.), to understand fishing as a cultural practice one would
need to concentrate on the relationship between the practice of fishing and the fundamental beliefs
that underscore Aboriginal culture, beliefs which, once again, find their most direct expression in
ritual, music, ceremony, and narrative.
4 Terminological issues arise at several points in this discussion.  Here, it needs to be made
clear that in the use of the expression “intellectual products,” I chose a term that, I believe, has
some carry-over to the context of intellectual property as it exists as a subject in domestic Canadian
law.  But to speak even of “products of the intellect” may be problematic from a traditional
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I wish to go further, however.  While it would be better if we are
to address the issue of the protection of Aboriginal culture to focus our
attention on such products of Aboriginal culture, this would mean
focusing on activities that are, at most, manifestations of Aboriginal
culture.  Such activities as storytelling, music and dance, dramatic re-
enactments and presentations, carvings and paintings, rituals,
ceremonies, and the content of the stories, songs, dances, and
ceremonies, touch more directly on—as more or less transparent
expressions of—that which an Aboriginal people would identify as what
is valuable or essential to their self-identity.5  But as such they do not
themselves, by themselves, comprise the culture of a people.  What may
be directly touched on by such activities—what I will refer to throughout
the rest of this article as “Aboriginal culture”—are the values, principles,
and beliefs that inform the physical manifestations, which give them
meaning, truth, and validity (if only to the people who live through these
meanings).  These sources of meaning are what are seen and felt by
Aboriginal peoples to be worthy of protection, as the “cultural property”
that they wish to have respected appropriately in regard to its
preservation, development, and transmission.
One aim of this article will be to argue that while the current
status of Aboriginal rights under Canadian law is primarily focused on
the protection of Aboriginal practices or activities, the protection of the
intellectual products of Aboriginal peoples has been made available, if
inadvertently.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, the main thesis of this
article is that this is not necessarily a positive outcome for Aboriginal
peoples.
Aboriginal perspective.  From such a perspective the “self” is typically not seen as a reflection of an
almighty God (and so capable of free creation in the spirit of an omnipotent being), but as a nexus
in a web of being, capable of creation only because of its interconnections with all of reality.
Nothing, on this model, is ever solely the creation of the atomistically defined individual artist or
intellectual, for the inspiration comes from the world around, the skill is courtesy of gifts from
various spiritual sources, and the resources to work on the project are made available by the
community and the world around.
To speak, then, of intellectual products that require protection from outside intrusion is only
to speak of particular manifestations of culture, the songs and stories, the paintings and ceremonies.
It is not to suggest that they might be worthy of protection because they are owned (by virtue, say, of
some form of a Lockean conception of property) by either the individuals that make up the
community, or the community itself (which might be suggested if we were to suppose that they see
themselves as the source of these products).  It would be better to think of the products as being
made through the work of the community, the value in their protection lying in their value to the
community as expressions of sacred teachings about core values and beliefs.
5 To say that these are “more or less” transparent expressions is to acknowledge that different
people, in different circumstances, will have greater or lesser facility in discerning the messages
transmitted through these activities.
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First, the deeper defining elements of an Aboriginal world—the
values, principles, and beliefs that go into the self-identification of a
people, which form their intellectual and spiritual inheritance—are such
that protection provided by Canadian sources is both unnecessary and
unwanted.  Aboriginal peoples are capable of providing the mechanisms
called for, and they must be left to develop the same.  Second, protection
from Canadian sources would be inappropriate, for it brings with it the
baggage of a Western conception of cultural property and would thereby
hinder progress towards appropriate Aboriginal control over a matter
that must be regulated by the people whose culture requires protection.6
While this article concludes with an examination of Aboriginal
rights at Canadian law vis-à-vis the protection of Aboriginal intellectual
products, the reader must keep in mind that the fundamental issues
addressed in this article concern the degree to which the recent
6 The only potential benefit that might flow from Canadian legal protection of Aboriginal
intellectual products would be realized if such protection served as one element going into a
program designed to protect and promote those conditions which themselves assist in the
transmission of a culture from the elders to the young.  Even so, this protection may not be required
(and certainly would not be as important as measures to counteract the myriad assimilationist
techniques and policies brought to bear over the last few centuries—counteractive measures such as
the protection of the integrity of Aboriginal languages, and efforts to raise communities out of the
social and economic quagmires in which they often find themselves).
See United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Indigenous
Populations of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, UN ESC, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4 Sub.2/1993/28 (1993) [hereinafter Cultural Study]; and
United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination
Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh
Session, UN ESC, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter
Study], cited in D. Suagee, “Human Rights and Cultural Heritage: Developments in the United
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations” in T. Greaves, ed., Intellectual Property Rights
for Indigenous Peoples: A Sourcebook (Oklahoma City: Society for Applied Anthropology, 1994) 193.
In his comments on the Study, Suagee notes, at 202-03 [emphasis in original]:
[T]he Study concludes that the most effective protection is for indigenous peoples to be
able to control their own territories. …
In a more fundamental sense, the Chairperson’s Study challenges the premise that
intellectual property rights law offers an appropriate legal framework for protecting
indigenous cultural knowledge and suggests that using the concept of intellectual
property transforms knowledge into a commodity that can be bought and sold.  The Study
concludes that … the basic philosophy behind these mechanisms [copyright and patent
law] conflicts with the philosophy of most indigenous peoples towards their cultural
knowledge.
…
The Study says that most indigenous peoples do not regard their heritage in terms of
property but rather in terms of individual and community responsibility, and that heritage
is more appropriately seen as a bundle of relationships rather than a bundle of economic
rights.
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jurisprudence intersects with the issue of protecting the defining
elements of a culture, and the impact this has on the general issue of
appropriately protecting the intellectual products of Aboriginal peoples.
This issue is resolved when we look closely at the sort of protection
Canadian law can afford, and consider this in relation to the truly
valuable elements of an Aboriginal world.
The examinination of the promise Canadian legal protection
holds for Aboriginal culture commences in Part III.  We will examine at
that point the means by which the courts have recently set to the task of
defining and protecting Aboriginal rights.  Once this is complete we can
then determine the extent to which these means can be employed in the
task of protecting Aboriginal culture.  But before launching into a
discussion of the judicially-determined status of Aboriginal rights,
further preparatory remarks are in order.
In particular, three things need to be discussed: first, the nature
of the relationship between the values, principles, and beliefs underlying
traditional practices and the intellectual products of a people, so that we
might see the nature of interest that Aboriginal peoples have in these
matters; second, the place of the concept of property in Aboriginal
culture; and finally, the concepts of tradition and change in
contemporary Aboriginal society and their relation to the resurgence in
Aboriginal self-governance.  Only then can we begin to appreciate the
issues around the protection of Aboriginal culture, and the proper role
the Canadian judicial system can play in this regard.
II. REMARKS ON CULTURE, PROPERTY, AND AN
ABORIGINAL PERSPECTIVE
A.  A People’s Story: The Issues
I wish to make use of a hypothetical situation, one in which we
suppose that a particular Aboriginal community has an interest in having
outside forces respect its assertions of control in relation to a particular
narrative.  For the sake of discussion let us pick out, in relation to this
hypothetical community, what is referred to by Western scholars as a
“creation story.”
The telling of this sort of narrative is often surrounded by the
sorts of community controls that correspond, functionally, to some of the
mechanisms in place in Canadian law for the protection of intellectual
property.  While these controls will vary from community to community
in regard to such details as who may be regarded as proper vehicles for
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the transmission of the narrative, on what occasions this narrative may
be appropriately told, and what audience the narrative, in its proper
telling, may be aimed towards, generally Aboriginal peoples had, and
continue to employ, what can be termed “institutional” tools in place to
regulate such matters.7
What, one might ask, could Canadian law add to these
community-based structures?  The problem, some might suggest, comes
from the fact that these controls have their origins as internal controls.
They developed out of a need to self-regulate the production and
transmission of cultural property within the community.  These
community-based controls cannot, then, adequately deal with outsiders
who might wish to try to “capture” the narrative in question, taking it
away to serve their own ends.8  What Canadian law could provide would
be the supplementation of these Aboriginal institutions with mechanisms
intended to prevent outside forces from making any unauthorized use of
this, or any other, intellectual product.  Just what these mechanisms
might look like is not clear, but presumably some form of protection
7 My basis for making this claim comes primarily from personal experience, in talking and
living with the Anishnawbe of Northwestern Ontario, for an all-too-brief period of time.  My own
people, the Inuit, have these controls, but in living down south I have had even less experience in
relation to them.  See further P.V. Beck & A.L. Walters, The Sacred: Ways of Knowledge, Sources of
Life (Flagstaff: Navajo Community College Press, 1992), especially c. 3, 5.
See A. Ranker (Makah), “Knowledge is Not Available to Just Anyone” in A.B. Hirschfelder,
ed., Native Heritage: Personal Accounts by American Indians, 1790 to the Present (New York:
Macmillan, 1995) 125, where the author explains the mission and policy of the Makah Cultural and
Research Center:
As a cultural institution, we would make a big mistake if we start to institutionalize and
make decisions for the families who are the traditional units of government in the Makah
community.  We make sure, when it comes to this kind of information [traditional
knowledge], that the rights of dissemination and access remain with the families and
remain with the elders.  Our elders are not afraid of death.  What they are afraid of is
having their words and things used wrong later on.
In our case, in Makah country, knowledge was not available to [just] anyone.  And it
was not available to everyone.  And that’s the way its been since the beginning of time. …
We feel it is not our responsibility to change that system. … In the Indo-European
community, many people believe that the person that writes the information down owns
the information.  In our case that is not correct.  It’s the person who speaks the
information that has control over that information.
8 One might locate the problem not merely in the infiltration into the community of external
forces, but (in this case) in the nature of the intruders, with the dynamic that arose out of the fact
that the communities, at least in the earlier stages of contact, had little concept of the business of
business.  The problem today, then, would not be that community-based structures per se cannot
adequately deal with outside forces, but that Aboriginal communities have been—and in some cases
continue to be—structured in such a way that outside commerically-minded forces can easily exploit
the situation with little likelihood of retribution.
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could be negotiated and implemented.9  A prohibition against the
unauthorized use of central elements of the culture, such as the creation
story, would undoubtedly form part of such a structure.
Should the various controls in place within an Aboriginal
community be regarded in Canadian domestic law as worthy of sanction
through the general sort of supplementation imagined?  We can look at
this claim from two directions, asking whether from within Canadian
jurisprudence any justificatory room for the protection of such
traditional controls can be found, and asking if Aboriginal communities
would have any need for whatever protection Canadian law could
provide.
We will explore the former question in the third section of this
article.  We can use the latter question as a springboard for getting into
the issue of the relation between the intellectual products of an
Aboriginal community and the values, principles, and beliefs that
ultimately define and determine the culture of the community.  This in
turn facilitates an investigation into the question of where Aboriginal
peoples locate value in relation to their cultural property.
B.  A People’s Story: Property?
It must be made clear that it is not necessarily important to the
Aboriginal community that the creation story be protected so that some
individual member(s) or sub-group of the community can enjoy the
protection of their “property interests.”  This would be to suppose that
there existed some sort of an “object,” possessing either intrinsic or
utilitarian value, the value of which (to the owners) would make it
9 In the United States, protection of Native American cultural property has been ostensibly
provided by several pieces of legislation.  In 1990, the United States Congress overhauled the Indian
Arts and Crafts Act of 1935, 25 U.S.C. § 305-305c (1994), the aim being to revamp legislation aimed
at protecting what I have referred to as intellectual products (though the focus of this piece of
legislation is, as the title suggests, somewhat narrower).  For a discussion of this renewed legislation,
see R.A. Guest, “Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes” (1995-96) 20 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 111; and J.K. Parsley, “Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An
Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990” (1993) 18 Am. Indian L. Rev. 487.  Guest
stresses a useful distinction, at 113-14, between cultural property (defined as “historical,
archaeological, and ethnographical objects, works of art, and architecture that embody a culture,”
government regulation of which is essentially protectionist and preservationist), and intellectual
property (defined as “novel expressions or embodiments of ideas,” government regulation of which
is protectionist but for the greater aim of higher productivity in the marketplace of intellectual
products).
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worthwhile for the community to assert, in relation to it, regulatory
control.10
While talk of intangible objects is intelligible (these objects, after
all, form the subject matter of much of intellectual property law), and
while one can go on to construct laws regulating the ownership of such
objects for the benefit of certain individuals, nothing like this sort of
underlying conceptualization can be found in traditional Aboriginal
world-views.
Given social and economic realities all Canadians face, and the
particularly bleak nature of this reality for Aboriginal Canadians, it is
understandable that there exists in contemporary Aboriginal
communities an economically driven need to go along with, indeed, to
exploit this way of conceiving of the intellectual inheritance of the
community.11  But this, I would argue, is only carried out in relation to
10 To take this approach would be to demarcate the limits of debate about issues surrounding
cultural intellectual property with lines linked to economic factors.  Of particular interest to some
are aspects of traditional Aboriginal knowledge that are potentially lucrative, should they be
transferred into biomedical or agricultural industries.  For example, there is increasing interest in
the traditional plant medicines of indigenous peoples from around the world, with mounting
pressure from parties intent on exploring the mass-market potential of these medicines.  A debate
has developed concerning the status of this knowledge as intellectual property of the communities
in which it is found.  Illustrative of arguments sympathetic to the claims of indigenous peoples is
T.C. Greaves, “The Intellectual Property of Sovereign Tribes” (1995) 17 Sci. Comm. 201.  But see
A. Stenson & T. Gray, “Cultural Communities and Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic
Resources” in T. Hayward & J. O’Neill, eds., Justice, Property, and the Environment: Social and Legal
Perspectives (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1997) 178, for an attack on the claim that indigenous
communities have a property interest in this form of traditional knowledge
My aim is not to show that Aboriginal peoples have a claim to intellectual property under
Western theories of property.  For instance, Stenson & Gray, ibid., examine the two primary
arguments a party can offer in support of its claim to intellectual property—an entitlement
approach that typically focuses on the labour a party has invested in the creation of the thing over
which ownership is claimed; and a proximity approach that claims ownership on the basis of the
things being in the immediate proximity of those claiming ownership.  Rather than engage them
about the extent to which Aboriginal communities could meet the requirements of these two
approaches in order to justify a claim to intellectual property rights in genetic resources (or over
creation stories), I question the need to engage in such a debate.  Doing so would be tacit
acceptance that such Western forms of justification set the parameters by which debates over
cultural property could be resolved.  My position is that, in a post-colonial space, other forms of
justification—those employed by Aboriginal peoples—must be examined.
Further, conceptually prior to this examination is an even more fundamental issue—the
question of the propriety of dealing with such things as traditional knowledge as intellectual
property, as property is conceptualized in the West.
11 See Queneesh Studios Inc. v. Queneesh Developments Inc., [1996] 67 C.P.R. (3d) 452
(B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Queneesh], a case that exemplifies this dominant conceptualization of
culture.  The dispute involved two commercial bodies that each sought to use the term Queneesh in
their names, the defendant being a corporation owned by an Indian Band.  The master dismissed
the Band’s motion to be joined as a defendant in the passing-off action, deeming the Band’s
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particular remote manifestations of the culture of an Aboriginal group. 12
One would not find, I suggest, that a traditional Aboriginal community
would ever entertain this conceptualization of culture in relation to
those intellectual products that lie close to the “core” of the world-view
of this people—what I have delimited with the term Aboriginal culture.
This core, traditionally, would not be available as a commercial product,
even to the economic benefit of the Aboriginal community itself.
It will be my aim in Part II (C)-(F), below, to argue for this point.
This argument will have several interlocking sub-arguments.  First, I will
suggest that from an Aboriginal perspective it makes little sense to
conceive of the desire to protect the integrity of the creation story and its
telling as connected to a property interest.  This suggestion will be
bolstered by considering and rejecting an argument to the contrary.  The
argument represents the point of view of those who would argue that
Aboriginal peoples employ a conceptual scheme that has room for, and
indeed must accommodate, a full-bodied notion of property.  Second, we
must look at the notion of “tradition.”  I will argue that far from being a
concept used to freeze “authentic” Aboriginal peoples in a “primitive”
and romanticized past, this concept is capable of being freely used by
Aboriginal peoples at any point in time.  Used freely by Aboriginal
peoples, the notion of tradition will not aim to capture some sense of
pre-contact “pure” Aboriginal culture, but rather will point to an
alternative and equally valid mode of conceptualizing, and thereby
understanding, the world.
C.  A People’s Story: Sacred
The model of acquisition and control of objects for the sake of
the advancement of individual aims and projects—a product of the West
in form and substance—means very little when seen through eyes
proprietary right to the name irrelevant to the action.  While the name under dispute in Queneesh
related to what the Band referred to, at 454, as a “culturally significant legend,” the only argument
germane to the dispute that the Band could raise (Master Horn rightly concludes) was based in a
bare claim to a proprietary right to the word.  Had the court been willing to hear the Band’s
argument on the basis of Aboriginal rights, then, as the master notes, at 456, a whole new can of
worms would have been opened up.  In such a situation the emphasis would have shifted from the
mere word to its relation to the “culturally significant legend.”  The use of Canadian law to exploit
economic interests in Aboriginal “culture” is limited to situations such as these, wherein the thing to
be protected is not Aboriginal culture or knowledge per se, but Aboriginal artifacts, or mere words,
or physical activities and products.
12 The confluence of this “economic reality” and the traditional conception of the nature of
the intellectual inheritance of a community often leads into a debate within the community over the
extent of commercialization that is proper and that can be carried out respectfully.
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accustomed to an Aboriginal world-view.  The interest that a traditional
community has in the protection of a core narrative lies in its sacredness,
in its role in the greater interconnected life-world of the overall
community.  Some element in the community will likely have what
outsiders may think of as “control” over this legend, having, for example,
sole authority to determine when and where this legend is to be told, and
by whom—but this is not the sort of control that corresponds to anything
like Western-style ownership.  Rather, this control comes with
responsibilities, and it is the set of responsibilities that are fundamental.
Ultimately it is the promotion of such values as balance, harmony, and
beauty that underscores the models of behaviour evident in traditional
communities.13
There are those who dub such a view of Aboriginal culture
romantic (and by implication false).  Brian Crowley distinguishes
between two “romantic” and “mistaken” views of Aboriginal culture: on
the one hand there is the “naive, romantic view” which “sees property as
a classic example of an alien (Western) imposition on native peoples
and, therefore, as a key element in the justification for some wholly new
institutional arrangement for them.”14  On the other hand there are the
“sophisticated proponents of [a] property-based difference” between
Aboriginal and Western cultures, those who argue the difference “is not
the absence of property in the Aboriginal culture but a radical
incompatibility in the meaning given property in that culture and the
culture of the West.”15
Let us consider the naive romantic view first.  Crowley’s central
argument relies on the interrelationships between the concept of
property and such concepts as theft, ownership, slavery, gifts (as
exchange), and territory.  Since (1) there can be no argument with the
historical record, which convincingly details the extent to which
Aboriginal peoples worked with and lived by these related concepts; and
(2) as a matter of conceptual ordering the latter concepts rely on the
more fundamental concept of property; Crowley concludes (3) that the
only explanation for the prevalence of the mistaken view that historically
Aboriginal peoples had no notion of property is a [romantic] distortion
of the nature of Aboriginal belief-structures.
13 See Beck & Walters, supra note 7; the Cultural Study, supra note 6; and the Study, supra note
6, on the protection of the cultural and intellectual property of indigenous peoples.
14 B.L. Crowley, “Property, Culture, and Aboriginal Self-Government” in H. Drost, B.L.
Crowley & R. Schwindt, Market Solutions for Native Poverty: Social Policy for the Third Solitude
(Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute, 1995) 58 at 59.
15 Ibid. at 64 [emphasis in original].
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As Crowley defines “property” there can be little disagreement
with the claim that Aboriginal peoples have employed, both traditionally
and in their modern lives, the notion of property.16  The weakness of any
argument that rests on this point is precisely its reliance on this
general—and thereby fairly empty—notion of property.  If to have the
concept of property requires no more than, for example, that one resist
the nonconsensual appropriation of the products of one’s labour, then
granted Aboriginal peoples have always had this concept.  Ultimately,
however, this means very little.  On this level of conceptualization the
concept boils down to a functional mechanism required in any system of
rules governing the interactions of social beings.17  If we accept
Aristotle’s conception of the human as an essentially social animal, then
not surprisingly all cultures will have a role for this abstract concept of
property.
The interesting arguments, then, must revolve around the more
sophisticated view of the place of the concept of property in Aboriginal
societies—the view that while it is true that Aboriginal peoples have
always had some general concept of property, this concept is radically
different in kind from the one operating in the Western world.  Crowley
attacks this position by arguing that, when examining the history of the
interaction of Western and Aboriginal peoples, what we see is not a
clash between two radically irreconcilable or alien systems of thought,
but merely the running together of two stages of economic evolution.
The advanced Western world, Crowley argues, passed through an early
period during which it was natural to think of property as socially-
conditioned (an echo of which is still present in the Western model).
16 See J. Borrows, “Negotiating Treaties and Land Claims: The Impact of Diversity Within
First Nations Property Interests” (1992) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 179 at 180, n. 3.  First, the
author points to the debate over the use of the word “property” in relation to First Nations’
understanding of land use.  Second,  in analyzing the historical development of both treaties and
land claims on Manitoulin Island, Borrows notes, at 185, that traditionally “[t]he Odawa and
Ojibway had well-developed systems to allocate property between themselves.”  Citing a number of
studies of the systems of allocation historically at play, Borrows paints a picture of an Aboriginal
time and place determined by rules which fix the allocation of potentially sparse resources (at 185-
86).  This illustrates that all systems of social ordering will employ a notion of property, once we
locate a suitable level of abstraction in relation to the concept.
17 Assuredly, if you come “out of nowhere” to steal a cache of food I have built up for the
benefit of my community, I will consider this inappropriate behaviour, unless, that is, there was
already in place a rule governing our situation which translates this “stealing away” into something
tacitly consensual.  For example, the rule might be: “If you need essential supplies desperately to
meet demands of your community, then so long as you do not seriously endanger my community
this removal is permissible (for I would be permitted the same if circumstances were reversed).”  If
this is thereby to conceive of these supplies as “my property,” then so be it.
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Operating in conjunction with the notion of property were concepts of
“stewardship, communitarianism, and cosmic connectedness.”18
But as the Western world passed through ever more complex
stages of growth the gradual development of a “context of scarcity”
(created by, amongst other things, population increases made possible by
new modes of production) determined that ever more sophisticated
conceptions of property were demanded.  In particular, it was essential
that the notion of private property take hold, for otherwise economically
irrational behaviour would destroy the advances made possible through
more efficient means of production.19
At the time of European contact, Crowley contends, Aboriginal
societies were still, by and large, stuck on the primitive hunter-gatherer
rung of the evolutionary social/economic ladder.20  Inevitably, once
interaction with European forces had reached a certain point in a certain
region of the New World a context of scarcity would develop, and the
Aboriginal people in that region would react in one of two ways: they
would either continue to operate with primitive notions of “communal
property,” and thereby destroy their own regional ecology; or they would
quickly ascend the evolutionary rungs, and develop their own
18 Supra note 14 at 67.
19 See ibid. at 66. Crowley appeals to a standard “tragedy of the commons” argument in
making this point.  See also his remarks on the enclosure movement in Britain, and a more extended
discussion, at 71ff., concerning the emergence in the Western world of the concept of private
property in concert with the loss of a vision of a “shared, concrete social project.”  The individualism
that Crowley champions in this regard is discussed in Part II(E), below.
20 This reveals clearly Crowley’s lack of historical/geographical understanding.  However, for
the sake of argument we can limit our discussion to the sub-arctic and North, and press on.
It is interesting to note that Crowley’s position has the flavour of one side of a long-standing
debate underlying common law jurisprudence on Aboriginal claims to title and rights.  The two
sides of the debate were ably advanced by Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda
before a junta called by Charles V at Valladolid, Spain in 1550.  Since that time there have been
those who follow in Las Casas’s footsteps, arguing that Indigenous Peoples are in every respect the
equal of Europeans, and those who follow in Sepúlveda’s footsteps, arguing, on the basis of some
neo-evolutionary or religious grounding, that Indigenous Peoples are lower than Europeans on the
civilized scale.  This debate, and its continuance in contemporary Canadian contexts, is explored in
T.R. Berger’s A Long and Terrible Shadow: White Values, Native Rights in the Americas, 1492-1992
(Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991).  While Crowley might appear to be arguing that Canada’s
Aboriginal peoples are not different in kind from the European settlers, what he is really saying falls
in line with new-evolutionaries.  Luckily for the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, Crowley argues, they
have the capacity to climb the evolutionary ladder, and so reach the vaunted heights first scaled by
the true leaders of the human race—the Europeans and their descendants.  This is the colonial
attitude that Aboriginal peoples must combat.
What is somewhat ironic is that the Aristotelean theory of inferior/superior races of humanity
used by Sepulveda has long been discredited, and the scientific theory of evolution does not contain
the notion of progress that is implied in Crowley’s account.
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sophisticated conceptions of private property.  Crowley points to studies
of the plains bison-hunters (who hunted the bison to near-extinction) to
illustrate the former path, and the “beaver-hunting” Montagnais of
Labrador (who developed a system of regulated trapping lines) to
illustrate the latter.21
The conclusions to draw, Crowley argues, are that, first,
Aboriginal peoples have always had a primitive conception of property,
not unlike that evident in the West in its earlier history; and second, this
conception differs only in degree, not in kind, from that which forms a
cornerstone of Western law and society today.  There is, then, no radical
incommensurability between the Aboriginal and Western conceptions of
property.  Those who would suggest that Aboriginal peoples work with a
notion of “communal property” that is alien to the West and its notion
of private property are ignoring the history both of the Western world
and of the interaction between the West and Turtle Island.
D.  A Reply to the Social Evolutionist
The sophisticated romantic view does not fall quite as Crowley
imagines.  A key link in his argument is the claim that natural economic
pressures dictate the evolution of the concept of property in societies.
This is connected to the claim that Aboriginal peoples, traditionally,
lived by a concept of property that reflected nothing more than the
primitive economic circumstances by which they found themselves
constrained.
While Crowley points out that, economically speaking,
Aboriginal societies were by and large efficient, this means very little, he
argues, since matters of economic efficiency only become important in
the context of scarcity.  Crowley quotes Peter Pearse in this regard:
Where resource values are low and organization costs are high, the system of users’ rights
is crude, and properly so.  But as resource values rise, raising as well the potential gain
from improved allocation arrangements, more sophisticated systems of property rights
can be expected to emerge. … [At the arrival of Europeans there] was no scarcity in the
economic sense and no allocation problem.  There was therefore no need for individual
property rights.22
The problem for Crowley’s account (and for those who would
agree with any picture grounded in such an historicist fashion), is that it
21 Supra note 14 at 68-69.
22 Ibid. at 68, citing P.H. Pearse, “Property Rights and the Development of Natural Resource
Policies in Canada” (1988) 14 Can. Pub. Pol. 307 at 308.
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rests on assumptions about “the good life” which, once brought to the
surface, shows the argument in its true Eurocentric glory.  To reveal
these assumptions one need only ask whether it is inevitable that, in
order for an Aboriginal people to survive, its conceptual framework
must develop along a path destined to incorporate an essentially
individualist private property regime.
On Crowley’s account, recall there are only two possible
outcomes for an Aboriginal society as it copes with the demands of
interacting with the Western world—either economically irrational
behaviour that leads inevitably to economic destruction, or the rapid
shift to a conception of property that accords with the Western model.
But why, one might wonder, must the Aboriginal world be conceived of
as limited to these two possibilities?  Is it not conceivable that an
Aboriginal society could continue to live as it has since “time
immemorial,” developing, so to speak, on its own terms?
Crowley’s imagination is limited not by the notion that the
situation admits only of irrational behaviour or realignment with models
centred on individual rights, but by the inability to imagine that
Aboriginal peoples could have been left alone.  Why, one might ask, is it
assumed that Aboriginal peoples will be forced to react, for example, to
the introduction of new modes of production, to new technologies, and
to new systems of resource allocation and distribution?
There is certainly an argument available to support the claim
that Aboriginal peoples had only the two paths to follow.  It would be
completely implausible to imagine, one might argue, that faced with the
intrusion of Western influences an Aboriginal people could simply
maintain its organizational structures, complete with reliance on the
social ordering intertwined with a communal property regime.  The
implausibility, one might add, is clear from a cursory glance at the
history of the various dynamics that ensued between Aboriginal societies
and Western forces.
But such an argument misses the point of the objection.
Granted, Aboriginal peoples historically reacted either by (a) suffering
from a mismatch between the traditional communal property-regime
and changed social/economic/technological conditions, or (b) adopting a
property regime not unlike that operative in the West—but the issue is
whether this had to be so.  The reason one cannot find a history of a
people able to remain completely rooted in its traditional world-view
while avoiding over-exploitation of resources, and the ensuing
devastation that would entail, is that there is no history in Canada of a
people being accorded the sort of respect that translates into tolerance
for their way of life.  The “inevitability” in Crowley’s argument, then,
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translates into the “inevitability” of Western advances and
impositions—hardly the sort of inevitability needed to uphold an
argument which purports to detail the advance of economic systems
from “primitive” to “modern.”
E.  Conditions of Choosing vs. Conditions of Sharing
A section of Crowley’s article might seem to defuse some of the
power of this line of attack.  In concert with the development of new
economic realities that push Aboriginal societies into either self-
destructive behaviour or development of more sophisticated conceptions
of property, Crowley argues, is the developing realization on the part of
Aboriginal peoples that both the Aboriginal model of social structure
and the theory upon which this rests are inferior to those offered by the
West.23
Aboriginal societies, Crowley argues, were historically organized
around what he terms “conditions of sharing” (“the obligations that
members of the group must meet in order to be entitled to a share in its
resources”24), while “modern Western society” has moved to an
organizational structure informed by “conditions of choosing” (“the
obligations all individuals must respect if they are to be left alone to
pursue their own vision of the good life”25).
Between these two, Crowley goes on to argue, the latter is
preferable, for a system built on a foundation determined by conditions
of sharing can only be justified in contexts where no experimentation
with alternative forms of life exist.  One consequence of the evolution of
the Western world was its movement into structures dictated by a
growing adherence to the notion of free individual choice, and an
inevitable consequence of the interaction of Aboriginal and Western
peoples is the realization by Aboriginal peoples that an alternative form
of life—one which will allow them freedom of choice—exists.
Once this realization takes hold, Crowley suggests, it is no longer
valid to conceive of Aboriginal communities on the basis of conditions of
sharing, for from that point on the free choice of the individual members
of a community must be called on to justify the existence of the people
as a people.  Crowley makes this point:
23 This developing realization need not be conscious.  The superiority of the Western system
need only be self-evident, and human nature would take over from there.
24 Supra note 14 at 73.
25 Ibid.
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Western society and its institutions—in particular, the institution of property—allow
many different life and community projects to co-exist, so long as they do so peacefully.
Communities based on communalism, sharing, and unity with nature … are welcome as
long as they do not require others to subsidize their way of life and as long as all the
participants are there voluntarily. … What cannot be accepted is the subjection of people
to the demands of … a community [organized on communitarian grounds] merely
because they happen to have some common objective characteristic such as race,
language, or class.26
He goes on to note that historically: “One consequence of [A]boriginal
contact with European cultures was to introduce choices that had been
inconceivable before. … The shift from social relations based on status
to those based on contract was under way.”27
The notion seems to be that, once exposed to the conditions of
choosing, there is no going back—Aboriginal peoples, as peoples, will
now be judged according to the choices they, as individuals, will make.
Once the homogeneous form of traditional Aboriginal existence
intersects with the modern world, an Aboriginal community can no
longer be justified on the basis of its being built on a bedrock
determined by a common project, for now the only acceptable form of
justification demands that it be built on a bedrock determined by
individual choice (which may then legitimate any communal project
which could animate the community).
Since this sort of inevitable shift in outlook goes hand-in-hand
with the movement from primitive notions of communal property to
modern notions of private property the fate is sealed for non-Western
modes of existence.  In seeing oneself now not as fundamentally
community-determined, but rather seeing the community determined
out of the fundamental interests of individuals, people become the sorts
of “social beings” best suited to conceive of the products of their labour
as properly theirs over which to claim ownership.  In so conceiving of
themselves such people are equipped to advance “sophisticated”
property claims against any who might move unwanted into their sphere
of control.
This sort of argument will not, however, rescue Crowley’s
general position.  My thesis, recall, is that the manifestations of
Aboriginal culture are deemed worthy of protection traditionally on the
26 Ibid. at 75-76 [emphasis in original].  This passage also suggests an alternative reading of
Crowley’s argument—that he is suggesting no more than that the powers-that-be in the West would
not and will not accept the organization of a community on communitarian grounds, as if this is
somehow simply and irreducibly evil.  Rather than imagine such a weak attempt at argumentation, I
choose instead to read into this section a bit more than might appear clearly and distinctly.
27 Ibid. at 76.
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basis not of some property interest that would entail these intellectual
products be conceived of as objects belonging to owners in the
community, but rather on the basis of their sacredness.  Crowley’s
argument can be put simply in this form: 1) Traditional pre-contact
Aboriginal societies worked with notions of communal property.  2)
Within these organizational structures some shared end ultimately
dictated the outcome of property questions and disputes.  A commonly
held vision of a shared end would, for example, determine the
relationships between individual members of a community and a
particular story.  3) As a result of the interaction of Aboriginal societies
and the Western world, notions of communal property were inevitably
superseded by conceptions of property that categorize such things as
stories as objects to be governed by private property regimes.  Even if it
were not the case that the West forced itself on Aboriginal societies (so
that we might imagine that Aboriginal societies could have continued to
employ an economic system matched to their economic circumstances),
the mere meeting of such forms of life meant that the Aboriginal
societies were bound to change.
The upshot of this line of reasoning is the notion that an
Aboriginal community would inevitably come to see its own intellectual
products in a Western fashion.  This, as Crowley notes, does not
necessarily mean that it would come to think, for example, of stories as
owned by individuals within the community, but it would mean that in
relation to other communities it would have to adopt a Western stance.
The community would inevitably come to assert: “We claim exclusive
ownership over these stories, such that they are our property, no one else
having the right to possess or use them for any end not approved by us.”
But the mere fact that Aboriginal communities will adopt this
stance is compatible with another, and I would argue equally plausible,
explanation of the actions of contemporary Aboriginal communities.
This alternative explanation relies on a picture of Aboriginal
communities as still connected to their traditions, and as “closing the
circle,” returning ever closer to their roots in a non-Western vision of the
world.
Let me grant, first, that conceiving of intellectual products as
“owned” by the community is a stance some Aboriginal peoples take
with respect to their intellectual inheritances.  But we need to consider
in this regard their reasons for doing so—they may not necessarily be as
Crowley envisions.  An Aboriginal community may reason that to exist
peacefully with other forms of life, to settle disputes, to operate
efficiently, it needs to work with the “sophisticated” notion of property.
Since the Aboriginal community cannot act as if other communities will
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treat its intellectual inheritance respectfully, it must assert publicly a
property interest.  This is, however, entirely consistent with a traditional
Aboriginal perspective, for the Western intellectual property rights
regime is simply being used as a shield to protect what cannot otherwise
be protected.
The Aboriginal community can continue to think, then, of its
intellectual products as sacred—as entailing responsibilities, not rights,
as not owned, or capable of being owned, by anyone—and yet use the
Western system as a means to further their ability to continue to think of
its inheritance in this way.28  The Aboriginal community continues to see
itself as asserting control over its collective inheritance, but only to
further the end of protection against outside forces, warranted by its
vision of the nature and proper place of both its sacred knowledge and
the intellectual products that flow from it.
F.  “Tradition”
The last few sections have made key use of the term
“traditional,” a term often treated with some suspicion.29  Much as labels
such as “Aboriginal” or “Native” are argued by some to be products of
an “outsider” epistemology, the term “traditional” is argued by some to
be merely another “political weapon.”30  This term is used, some suggest,
28 I am not suggesting that all Aboriginal communities reason this way.  But I would suggest
that one consider this possibility before claiming that it is otherwise.  The situation may be
significantly more complex than those who fall in Crowley’s fold have imagined.
29 The debate about the use of this term has some parallels and linkages to a current debate
about such terms as “Aboriginal” and “Indigenous.”  See, for example, S. Wright, “Intellectual
Property and the ‘Imaginary Aboriginal’” in G. Bird, G. Martin & J. Nielson, eds., Majah:
Indigenous Peoples and the Law (Annandale, Aust.: Federation Press, 1996) 129.  An interesting
look at the use of the term “Indian” from an Aboriginal perspective can be found in Dennis
McPherson’s contribution to D.H. McPherson & J.D. Rabb, Indian From the Inside: A Study in
Ethno-Metaphysics (Thunder Bay: Centre for Northern Studies, Lakehead University, 1993) c. 2.
An outsider epistemology, some argued, leads to fictions generated by the dominating or colonizing
forces as they turn their uncomprehending gaze upon peoples they would rather control than
understand.
30 During the academic years 1994-95 and 1995-96 I was involved with a course in Aboriginal
culture at Lakehead University (through the Department of Indigenous Learning).  In struggling
with the nature of my involvement with such an enterprise, I slowly came to see my “best” role to be
as a facilitator of “cooperative” courses, wherein the class, myself included, could work with issues
as a group.  We often returned to the issue of “tradition,” a troubling concept for many who, like
myself, have little of the traditional means by which to grow intellectually, emotionally, spiritually,
and mentally, as Aboriginal individuals.  I would not say that any one person in those two classes
would say exactly what I have to say on the subject—I take responsibility for all mistakes.  A taste of
the discussions that ensue on this point can be found in G.R. Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our
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to generate a false idealized notion of some attribute we can apply to
various “authentic” elements of Aboriginal society.  So one hears talk of
a “traditional” pipe ceremony, a “traditional” story, a “traditional” elder,
all the while imagining that something substantive is being said about the
pipe ceremony, the story, and the elder.
This, some argue, is to pick out certain features present in the
ceremony, the story, and the elder, and elevate them to a misplaced
prominence.31  What exactly does the story (or the ceremony, or the
elder) exhibit such that we can say that it is traditional, while a similar
story with, say, Christian overtones is classified as non-traditional?32
Further, in this time and place, with Aboriginal communities living in
and through varying degrees of mixture with Western culture, what
could possibly count as traditional?
Some would go so far as to challenge the Western scholar,
arguing that the very dichotomy between “traditional” and “modern”
reveals a Western conceptualization of Aborginal peoples which would
not be forthcoming from Aboriginal communities themselves.
Do Aboriginal peoples object to the act of classifying in line with
categories determined by the traditional/modern dichotomy?  This
cannot be so, for Aboriginal peoples do so too, and the struggle to
reinvigorate traditionalism illustrates this process of classification.33
Perhaps, then, the objection is to mistakes made by non-Aboriginals in
their attempts to delineate the traditional from the modern.  This
undoubtedly constitutes much of the problem as seen from the
Aboriginal perspective, but it does not reach down to the deep objection
to the classificatory process—that it is a component of a dis-empowering
Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1995) at 121-28.
31 A related concern in this context is that by employing such a concept one may be
introducing an essentialist conceptualization of Aboriginal cultures which is both false and
dangerous.  One outcome of such a conceptualization, those who find such a model dangerous
argue, is that a contemporary people, insofar as they do not live up to the idealized features that
combine to define the “traditional” Aboriginal community, are as non-Aboriginal as someone born
and raised a Scot.  Such a concern is misplaced, for an essentialist conceptualization is forthcoming
that need not carry with it the notion that certain defining features of a culture make up a core of
identity which, once lost, spells the demise of the “traditional” form of that people.  This is the sort
of conceptualization I sketch out in the rest of this section.
32 Furthermore, why is this classification done by Western scholars?  What is the ultimate
purpose of this classification process?  How can a Western scholar presume to know an Aboriginal
society so well as to be able to claim that a certain story is traditional, while another is non-
traditional?
33 See Alfred, supra note 30.
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regime of interpretation, what some term an “interpretative
monopoly.”34
It is mostly irrelevant whether the classificatory attempts by non-
Aboriginals hits the mark, whether the lines between traditional and
modern were laid out appropriately—the concern is with the process
being done from the outside, with the loss of self-identity that follows
from the notion that someone else has the power to determine essential
features of one’s own identity.
Tied into this concern over dis-empowerment is the feeling that
those who would do so are immensely disrespectful of those they turn
their classificatory mechanisms upon.  The problem, then, arises out of
the hubris of the Western colonizer.  This colonizer has the arrogance to
argue (or merely presume) that the Western conceptual scheme is
privileged, that out of all the ways of “cutting up” the world he does so in
such a way that he either gets to, or has the best chance of getting to, the
Truth about the world.
The real danger in using such language as “traditional” and
“modern,” then, is in its being used by the outsider to overlay another set
of meanings, ones that may or may not correspond to “the way things
are” (where here I leave open that there might be a way things are
objectively, which is approached to a lesser or greater degree by
conceptual schemes).
I use the term “traditional” believing that, used from the
perspective of a Western conceptual world, it obscures or confuses the
way things are.  The real problem, however, is with the lack of any
serious attempt to consider, by those who wish to use such terms, the
possibility that they might be contributing to confusion and/or
obscurantism.  Once one recognizes this as the problem, one can begin
to wonder whether there is not some variant of “traditional” (and its
usual contrast “modern”) which is present in the conceptual scheme of
Aboriginal peoples.  This is a fairly simple matter to investigate—one
need only talk to Aboriginal people.
Western scholars need to simultaneously (a) avoid colonialist
treatment, while (b) allowing Aboriginal peoples the opportunity to
explain that they might employ, in certain situations (though perhaps for
different reasons), much the same distinctions the colonialist would
propound.  In particular, use of the term “traditional” by Western
scholars may indeed be problematic, not because it imposes on
34 See M.E. Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretative
Monopolies, Cultural Differences” (1989-90) Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3; and “Home/Land” (1991) 10
Can. J. Fam. L. 17.
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Aboriginal peoples an instance of colonialist conceptualizing, but
because those wishing to avoid the imposition are then blinded to the
possibility that Aboriginal peoples themselves may wish to freely use such
a concept, and perhaps in much the same way that Western scholars
employ the term.
Let me suggest, then, that to say that a particular legend is
“traditional” is not to say merely that it embodies, or is capable of
transmitting, certain concepts which are part and parcel of the
Aboriginal conceptual scheme in place prior to contact (though saying
this captures some aspect of what it is for a narrative to be classified as
traditional).  Rather, the key point is that this legend expresses the sort
of value-laden principles and beliefs that underlie timelessly the non-
Western Aboriginal world-view.35  To put it this way reveals, among
other things, that a legend could be dreamed tomorrow that is as
“traditional” as any passed down before contact.  It also lays bear the
existence not of some sort of chasm between “traditional” and
“modern,” as these terms are wont to be used by Western scholars, but
of a spectrum lying along the line of analysis laid out by these terms.
One can speak, then, of a modern retelling of a traditional
legend, and enter into a discussion of the extent to which it is modern
and traditional.36  It will be traditional to the extent that the modern
retelling still captures and expresses the values and beliefs embedded
in—and grounding—a non-Western Aboriginal world-view.  It will be
“modern” to the extent that it interweaves into the traditional narrative
35 Once again, I cannot provide much by way of documentary support for this suggestion.  A
number of people have expressed something like this notion in conversation.  What comes across
clearly is the idea that what is traditional in the Aboriginal context is not what is “old” or “archaic,”
“primitive” or “arrested,” but rather what is timeless.  The trick is to convert the timeless core, via a
contemporary expressive form, into a message understandable at this time and place.
Thoughts that run parallel to these are expressed in several passages in J. Borrows, “With or
Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)” (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629.  See in particular
comments, at 646-49, concerning the source of First Nations Law in stories that “represent the
accumulated wisdom and experience of First Nations conflict resolution. … While the timeless
components of the story survive as the important background for the central story, its ancient
principles are mingled with the contemporary setting and with the specific needs of the listeners.”
36 In this discussion I often use the terms “Aboriginal” and “traditional” synonymously (and
likewise with “Western” and “modern”).  This is, of course, poetic—the identification and
juxtaposition being employed for the sake of discussion.  There is also the traditional Western
perspective and the modern Aboriginal perspective.  What I am trying to say, however, is that many
modern “Aborigines” (especially those, like myself, educated—perhaps too highly—in Western
institutions) are interested in the “traditional” Aboriginal perspective, the one free of Western taint,
in hopes of finding there a set of underlying values and principles by which to structure one’s life in
a meaningful form.  In this way we self-consciously accept the divide between Aboriginal/traditional
and Western/modern—aware that we ourselves live much of our lives through the Western/modern
mode.
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such things as Christian themes.  To the extent that “traditional”
Aboriginal values and beliefs intersect with “modern” Western values
and beliefs we would say that it does not really matter that the retelling
takes place in this time and place.37
It is my contention that the traditional Aboriginal perspective is
engaged in an intricate dance with the modern Western perspective,
neither perspective dominating.  For Aboriginal peoples the project is to
nurture the core of timeless principles and beliefs, while continually
designing and refining tools to protect their ability to continue as the
peoples they have been since time immemorial.
In particular, it would seem that the treatment a traditional
Aboriginal community would give to what the West defines as
“intellectual property” is founded on, and so only understandable from,
principles and values distinct from those offered by the Western world-
view.  In this regard I agree with David Vaver when he states:
[Intellectual property] is founded on a modern emphasis on the individual and individual
rights, and on encouraging and celebrating creativity and innovation as paths to both self-
fulfillment and social advance.  By contrast, Eastern and traditional cultures that
emphasize social obligation, submersion of the self, respect for tradition, and the
replication of traditional forms and themes provide inhospitable soil for Western
conceptions of intellectual property.38
This discussion, however, is not focused on the “fit” of Western
conceptions of intellectual property to traditional cultures.  It is time
now to turn to the question of the extent to which the judicially-
determined conception of Aboriginal rights (as protected under section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198239) can be brought in to protect what I
have suggested determines traditional Aboriginal culture.  What is
important to bear in mind is that the traditional Aboriginal world-view
may be constructed on the basis of values and beliefs that make
protection from the outside (for example by the usual Western tools of
copyright, patent, and trademark) both inappropriate and misguided.
37 This is to oversimplify somewhat, for the fact remains that in this time and place the
audience will be, typically, “non-traditional,” whereby this means that they live their narrative lives
by values and beliefs which are rooted more in the Western point of view.  As I noted earlier, to be
honest, many, if not most, Aboriginal people (especially the young like myself) lie along the
spectrum more towards the “modern.”  A cultural renaissance has, however, been building in
strength over the last few decades.
38 D. Vaver, Intellectual Property Law (Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997) at 4; and see Cultural
Study, supra note 6.
39 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. [hereinafter Constitution Act].
Section 35(1) provides: “The existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
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In particular, one needs to enter the remainder of the discussion
open to the possibility that Aboriginal peoples continue to employ a
traditional conception of property.  Moreover, this conception is not
“primitive,” a step on a graduated path to something akin to the
sophisticated Western conception, but rather one that quite simply puts
value not on ownership but on an interconnected web of responsibilities.
III. CANADIAN DOMESTIC LAW AND THE PROTECTION
OF ABORIGINAL CULTURE
A.  The Test
In 1996 the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a number of
companion cases, key among which was Van der Peet.40  This decision
laid out tests that would be applied to claims pressed in relation to those
Aboriginal rights worthy of protection under section 35 of the
Constitution Act.
If a case were to be made before a Canadian court for an
Aboriginal right to the protection of the sort of “intellectual property”
mentioned in the hypothetical situation discussed above, it would have
to follow the guidelines being developed as the nature of the protection
offered by section 35 of the Constitution Act is fleshed out and
interpreted.  Generally speaking, it would be fair to say that the process
of fleshing out what section 35 means, and what it protects, has
restricted the range of Aboriginal affairs that are considered worthy of
constitutional protection.41  Earlier movements that were promising
have since been supplanted by jurisprudence which makes it difficult to
argue before the present-day courts for truly substantive Aboriginal
rights.42
40 Supra note 1.
41 See J. Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster”
(1997) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37.
42 As was repeatedly suggested in Delgamuukw at the Court of Appeal level, Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia (A.G.) (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Delgamuukw C.A.],
claims to Aboriginal title and rights to self-determination might best be dealt with through
negotiation.  Clearly, though, this is to have to choose between two unsavoury options, for
negotiation between the Crown and First Nations is fraught with pitfalls.  Not least among the
factors weighing against the possibility that negotiations would lead to anything like a “just”
outcome are the relative negotiating positions—on the one hand, the Canadian state, with its
immense resources, comes from a position of near-complete power, while, on the other hand,
Aboriginal communities are supported with little but weak public opinion and some capacity to
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The initial promise of a new era in jurisprudence on Aboriginal
issues was generated by Sparrow.43  Building on the notion of the sui
generis nature of Aboriginal rights and title, the Court advocated a
system whereby the Crown would now have to justify any infringement of
existing Aboriginal rights (where existing rights are those not clearly
extinguished by valid Crown action before the recognition and
affirmation of Aboriginal rights in 1982).
While a promising development toward what one might think of
as “post-colonial” jurisprudence,44 this was only a movement in that
direction, for it accepted the presumptions that (1) the Crown had the
power to unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal rights prior to 1982, so long
as its intent to do so was clear and plain; and (2) the Crown now has the
power to infringe on Aboriginal rights, so long as it can justify this
infringement according to standards set by Canadian courts.  A truly
post-colonial stance would be one which recognized and accepted that
embarrass the Crown.  Establishing a distinct regime of intellectual property protection may
necessitate compromising other objectives, and might run into problems in the eyes of “the public”
(given, for example, arguments about freedom of information in relation to the “public domain”:
see Guest, supra note 9 at 125).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw, supra note 1, does not seriously
impact on this situation.  While there are some highly suggestive comments in relation to the nature
of Aboriginal title, and the extent to which it still exists and must be accommodated, little additional
light is cast on the nature of Aboriginal rights in general.  The Van der Peet test is still domestic
Canadian law, so much as it stands, in this regard.
43 Supra note 1.  One could say that earlier cases, like Guerin, supra note 1, played a major role
in setting the stage for the decision in Sparrow.  In Guerin the Court laid out the role the Crown
must play in dealing with First Nations, a role by and large determined by its being situated in a
fiduciary or trust-like relationship created by its historic dealings with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples.
Sparrow, however, was the first occasion for the Supreme Court of Canada to set about the task of
deciding what the nature and scope of Aboriginal rights might be in light of their entrenchment in
the Constitution, and in its expression of principles began a movement beyond the patriarchal
framework evident in cases such as Guerin.
Signaling a growing awareness of the difficulties inherent in applying the common law in the
context of disputes over Aboriginal rights without regard to the colonial tenor that it sustains, the
Court in Sparrow held, at 1112, that Aboriginal rights are “held by a collective and are in keeping
with the culture and existence of that group.  Courts must be careful, then, to avoid the application
of traditional common law concepts of property as they develop their understanding of … the ‘sui
generis’ nature of Aboriginal rights.”
44 See J. (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, The Míkmaw Concordat (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997).
Henderson defines post-colonial theory, at 23, as
an intellectual strategy of colonized Aboriginal scholars and writers.  It is a criticism that
confronts the unequal process of representation by which the historical experience of the
colonized Aboriginals comes to be framed in Eurocentric scholarship.  It seeks to end the
privileged position of Eurocentrism and colonial thought in modern society and create
parity in modern thought.
Sparrow contained a faltering step in the direction of post-colonial jurisprudence insofar as it
gestured toward the notion of parity in legal thought between Canadian domestic law and the laws
of Aboriginal peoples.
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Canada acted, and continues to act, as a colonial power, dispossessing
peoples who had, and continue to have, prior legal and political status on
the land lying within the boundaries of present-day Canada.45
Regardless of the extent to which Sparrow signaled a new era in
Canadian/Aboriginal jurisprudence, to answer the question about the
extent of judicial protection that the courts have made possible in
relation to Aboriginal claims, we need to go beyond this decision.  In
particular, we need to look at the more recent Supreme Court of Canada
decisions.  Courts subsequent to Sparrow often found ways to narrow the
implications posed by the echo of a post-colonial tenor heard in this
landmark decision.  This avenue was open since lower courts did not find
in Sparrow directions on how to determine whether a claim fits as a
claim to an Aboriginal right.
Along the way to the most recent Supreme Court of Canada
pronouncements some “progress” was made towards filling this gap.  In
Delgamuukw C.A.46 a test was laid down that, with some modifications,
has come to be accepted as offering a guide to determining whether an
alleged Aboriginal claim to title over a specified territory can be said to
be protected as an instance of an Aboriginal right falling under section
35.  This test is, in turn, born out of tests laid down in Baker Lake47 and
Guerin.48  It asks the Aboriginal people in question to show: 1) that they
[the Aboriginal people] and their ancestors were members of an
organized society; 2) that the organized society occupied the specific
territory over which they assert the Aboriginal title; 3) that the
occupation was to the exclusion of other organized societies; and 4) that
the occupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was
asserted by England.
This is drawn from Baker Lake, quoted with approval in
Delgamuukw C.A. by the majority of the British Columbia Court of
45 There are those who see in Sparrow little, if any, post-colonial tenor.  See M.E. Turpel,
“Home/Land,” supra note 34 at 20 [footnotes omitted]:
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, such as Sparrow and Sioui [supra note
1], have been hailed as progressive and seen as attempts to more fully embrace
[A]boriginal images of legal and political responsibilities, creating the place for
[A]boriginal peoples to stand and construct their vision of a relationship with the state. …
Nevertheless, they are squarely within the colonial legal tradition.  The acceptance
without critical examination, in Sparrow for example, of the underlying sovereignty of the
Crown over [A]boriginal peoples, situates the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
squarely within the colonial tradition.
46 Supra note 42.
47 Supra note 1.
48 Supra note 1.
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Appeal (speaking through Macfarlane J.A.),49 and has carried over to
the most recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on Aboriginal
claims to title.  The clarification added by the Court of Appeal concerns
the “exclusivity” requirement, for as the Court of Appeal noted it may
be possible to imagine that hunting and fishing would be constitutionally
protected Aboriginal practices that were not linked up with the practice
of excluding all other peoples from particular territories.
The Supreme Court of Canada has pulled out of Macfarlane
J.A.’s judgment a conceptualization of the nature of Aboriginal rights
which has stabilized as the model for treatment of claims to protection
of Aboriginal interests.  In Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. noted that
Macfarlane J.A. found in Delgamuukw C.A. that an Aboriginal right is to
be accorded constitutional protection where evidence establishes that it
had “been exercised, at the time sovereignty was asserted, for a sufficient
length of time to become integral to the Aboriginal society.”50  This
captures the tenor of the most recent pronouncements on Aboriginal
rights, for it signals the closing of the “post-colonial” promise held out in
Sparrow.  To see how this is so, one needs to consider the underlying
conceptual shift that has taken place, a shift made clear by the
enunciation of a new “vision” of the purpose behind protecting
Aboriginal rights.  This vision is spelled out in great detail in Van der
Peet.51
The key term is now “reconciliation,” where careful
consideration of the things to be reconciled is crucial.  On one side of
the reconciliation equation is the simple fact the Canadian system of law
and governance must now squarely face: “when Europeans arrived in
North America, Aboriginal peoples were already here, living in
communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they
had done for centuries.”52
This passage carries a significant amount of just-below-the-
surface information about how the Court is now going to deal with
claims advanced by Aboriginal peoples.  Built into the wording is a re-
entrenchment of the common law position on the legal rights of
Aboriginal peoples vis-à-vis the land—they did not, and do not, own the
land, but rather have, at most, an odd, sui generis, “beneficial interest.”
The Court slides this in with the notion that Aboriginal peoples have
49 Supra note 42 at 512.
50 Van der Peet, supra note 1 at 529, citing Delgamuukw C.A., supra note 42.
51 Ibid. at 538-48.
52 Ibid. at 538 [emphasis in original].
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always lived “on the land,” an expression that captures this sense of a
people riding on top of the land, not having the sort of deep connection
which the Euro-Canadian system respects as ownership.53
Key to the discussion in this article is the reference in this
passage to Aboriginal cultures.  Continuing and solidifying a trend in
Canadian jurisprudence, the emphasis in Aboriginal law shifts entirely to
the nebulous realm of such things as “traditional practices” and cultural
artifacts.54
The “simple fact” of historic Aboriginal occupation and use of
land is now to be reconciled with the other side of the equation—the fact
of Crown sovereignty.  Since the historical situation is that Aboriginal
peoples were “here first,” the Court must replace the old tired colonial
53 I would suggest that this completely misses the nature of the relationship between
Aboriginal people and the land as conceptualized through an Aboriginal perspective—rather than
“riding on top of the land” Aboriginal people see themselves as part of the land, as being more than
simply connected.  The Western model of property typically conceives of the ownership relationship
as grounded in recognition of certain powers of the owner, such as the exclusive capacity to control
the use of the land.  The land, then, does not so much form a reciprocal identity-relation with the
owner as it is first objectified and then subsumed under the owner’s identity.
For the Aboriginal community, on the other hand, the land itself is part of who they are and
they are part of the land.  What tighter connection could one imagine?  In contrast to this vision
how preposterous the Western conception seems (as if this essentially human-human-object relation
deserves recognition and protection)!  What justifies the “right” of the owner to control the use of
the land to the exclusion of all others?  The recognition accorded by society?  But what exactly is
society recognizing?  Or, to put the same point in another way, what justifies the recognition
envisioned?  The “owner” is simply riding on top of the land, as a bronco-buster rides an untamed
horse, with the difference being that the owner is sadly confused, for he or she will never subdue or
tame the land.  Without the identity-relation, the link between owner and the land is too tenuous to
be justified by anything other than sovereign fiat.  Again, what leads society to recognize the “right”
of the owner to control the use of the land?
Someone in agreement with Crowley’s basic position might argue that the relationship
sanctioned through the Western concept of ownership has been developed to meet the need that
arises in contexts of scarcity—without this sort of system there would be no efficient exploitation of
resources and all would suffer.  As I argued earlier, this line only goes so far in cross-cultural
contexts.  Without Western intrusion the Aboriginal relationship upheld, and could continue to
uphold, an equally valid regime of land management.
54 The focus on traditional activities or practices of Aboriginal societies has been linked to a
particular time frame, the period before the assertion of sovereignty.  The issue of time frame is
seen as crucial in jurisprudence in this area, and tellingly in Van der Peet itself the majority of the
Court went on to radically narrow what had, with this element, come to be an extremely tight noose
around the necks of Aboriginal peoples.  The Court decided that the assertion of sovereignty is not
important.  Rather it is the point of contact that is the key historical date.  Some loosening of this
noose was performed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1098, for the
alternative time frames were separated.  The Court there attempted to justify applying the point-of-
contact frame to the determination of Aboriginal rights, in contrast to the application of the
assertion-of-sovereignty frame, to the determination of Aboriginal title.  Rather than unpack the
Court’s attempt, it would be best to stand back and ask whether the establishment of any fixed time
frame should be an important and potentially determinative issue.  See Borrows, supra note 41.
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fictions of terra nullius and “discovery” and fall back on its one remaining
story, elevating this to a new level of prominence—the Crown is
unquestionably recognized as the sole legitimate sovereign power.  The
remainder of this section of Van der Peet55 provides a deeper explication
of this situation, as seen and justified through the eyes of the colonial
masters.
The landmark American cases56  from the first half of the
nineteenth century are pulled in to support the notion that while Native
claims have indeed always existed at common law, these claims must be
reconciled with the unquestioned fundamental existence of European
sovereignty.  Similarly, the landmark Australian case Mabo v.
Queensland (No. 2)57 is mentioned briefly,58 the intent being to support
the same point.  The idea the Court is working with is quite clear, if one
accepts a return to the old colonial frame of mind: Aboriginal peoples
were in fact “here first,” but in pre-contact times they were only users of
the land, not owners in the sense recognized at common law, and as such
their mere presence was, and still is, subject to assertion of sovereignty
by any European polity (read “advanced” and “superior” culture)
happening upon the scene.59
What comes of this return to hegemony is a test for Aboriginal
rights (the Van der Peet test) that focuses exclusively on the existence of
traditional activities or practices integral to the society in question at the
time of contact.  Should evidence be presented and accepted that the
right claimed today enjoys a requisite degree of continuity with a
practice that was integral to the distinctiveness of the ancestors of the
people in question, that practice, in its modern form, will be protected
under section 35.  It also must be kept in mind that (a) the right claimed
must be carefully characterized as people-specific, but conceptually
generalized; (b) the requisite degree of continuity does not require
55 Supra note 1 at 538-48.
56 The seminal cases are commonly referred to as Chief Justice Marshall’s trilogy: Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  Lamer C.J., in Delgamuukw, supra note 1, does not
mention the middle case in this series, perhaps because in that case Marshall C.J. introduced, and
elaborated on, his notion of a “domestic dependent nation,” a concept that, given its “sovereign-to-
sovereign” undertones, would be too troublesome in the present context.
57 (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Aust. H.C.).
58 See Van der Peet, supra note 1 at 544-46.
59 The notion that Aboriginal peoples could have been recognized in political units is not even
mentioned.  Rather the tests are exclusively focused on whether or not the people in question were
“organized into societies,” as if this could somehow be accomplished without a political framework.
Clearly a complete return to a colonial mentality has taken place.
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temporal continuity; (c) the “distinctiveness” of the practice is
determined by asking whether the people in question would be the
people they were if this practice were not there, and; (d) the modern
practice must be such that European influence is not responsible for its
present manifestation or form.60
The ironic twist to this twisted tale is that the newly devised test,
while pulling the courts back from post-colonial jurisprudence, makes
room for the protection of manifestations of traditional Aboriginal
culture.  While, unquestionably, the Court in Van der Peet had in mind
(minimally) protecting physical activities, the test it lays out works
remarkably well in relation to those intellectual products identified
earlier as lying closer to those elements that define the core or essential
being of the Aboriginal life-world.  That is, the test in Van der Peet seems
oddly constructed to work well in relation to narratives, ceremonies, and
other intellectual products of Aboriginal communities (with major
provisos to be discussed shortly).
B.  The Application of the Test
Let us return to the hypothetical situation.  The first step in
protecting against the inappropriate appropriation of the creation story
would be to characterize the impugned right in such a way that it is
people-specific, and yet cast in generalized terms.  We can do this by
characterizing the claim as the right to the exclusive control and use, by
the Aboriginal community, of “culturally significant legends”—to
borrow a phrase from Queneesh.61
The second hurdle would involve demonstrating that the interest
in having exclusive control and use of these sorts of legends existed at
the point of contact, and that it continues to this day.  The latter point
would not be too difficult to show (in most contexts), for many
communities are in the midst of a process of cultural rejuvenation,
exploring means by which they can reconnect with the “life-worlds” of
their ancestors.
In some situations there could be, however, obstacles in relation
to the first point.  The Gustafsen Lake situation illustrates some of the
60 See Borrows, supra note 41.  Borrows criticizes in turn each of these provisions, in particular
calling into question the Court’s decision to “freeze” Aboriginal rights at the time of contact.  What
is required, Borrows argues, is a test for Aboriginal rights which pays attention to the internal or
inherent nature of the rights claimed, a test which would then rely on the Aboriginal perspective.
61 Supra note 11.
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evidentiary and conceptual problems.62  On the one hand it might be
argued that the sun dance ceremony was never practiced in the interior
of British Columbia, a fact that, if true, would make it difficult to argue
for a contemporary Aboriginal right to continue to practice this
ceremony at that location.  On the other hand, it might not be an issue
about whether the sun dance was a practice carried out in the interior,
but whether it could be shown that such was the case.  What sort of
evidence is available, what the court will permit itself to hear, what
weight it will give to what it hears—these are the sorts of difficult
evidentiary issues that might arise.63
The second set of obstacles are both more difficult to deal with
and more enlightening in relation to the main topic of this article.  It
would need to be shown that the Aboriginal people in question had an
interest in maintaining exclusive control and use of the creation story at
the time of contact.64  I believe this could be shown (in many if not most
62 In the summer of 1995 a group of Aboriginal people gathered at a religious site in central
British Columbia to participate in a religious ceremony known by some as a “Sun Dance.”  The site
is on a private ranch, and had been used in preceding years for the purpose of conducting this
ceremony with little or no complaint from the rancher.  On this occasion, however, a dispute with
the rancher sparked and a stand-off between the Sun Dancers and police forces developed.  Many
of those who participated in the stand-off were charged with various counts of trespassing, mischief,
and attempted murder.  A report that discusses some of the ensuing legal and political battles and
controversies can be found in J.G.A.E. Switlo, Gustafsen Lake Under Siege: Exposing the Truth
Behind the Gustafsen Lake Stand-off (Peachland, B.C.: TIAC Communications, 1997).
63 The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at 1069, would seem
to have lowered the barriers in this regard, the majority holding that the oral testimony of
Aboriginal peoples must be placed on an equal footing with the documentary evidence familiar to
the courts.  To see how this works out “on the ground” in Aboriginal litigation we will have to wait
for further developments, to ascertain the extent to which Canadian courts not only listen to oral
evidence, but afford it substantial—indeed potentially equal—weight.
64 In characterizing the impugned right as to the exclusive control and use of this culturally
significant story, we would then seem constrained by the test in Van der Peet, supra note 1, to show
that this right existed at the point of contact.  There are two factors that complicate the situation,
one which acts to cause concern, the other which acts to alleviate some of this concern.
Sparrow, supra note 1, seemed to suggest a turn away from an analysis of rights that effectively
froze them at contact.  The Court held that Aboriginal rights must be conceived of as capable of
evolving over time.  The limitation on this notion of evolution is that such instances which reflect
the incursion into the traditional activity of a direct European influence may not be protected (the
test to apply involves asking whether the impugned right exists as characterized as a result of
Western influence, so that it would not make sense to refer to this right as an Aboriginal right).  We
must consider, then, whether in the case of protecting the right to the exclusive control and use of a
story, the influence of European forces account for the very need to protect the story.  If this is so,
some might argue, the test would dictate that this is not an Aboriginal right.
Here, however, it would seem that far from having to avoid protecting rights which derive their
substance from European influence, the court would be asked to protect rights which derive from a
need to protect certain elements of Aboriginal culture from European forces.  Since the purpose
behind the limitation to the doctrine of evolving rights lies in the need to avoid protecting rights that
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contexts imaginable), notwithstanding the fact that any opposing party
would have little trouble showing that many, if not most, Aboriginal
peoples were willing to share most, if not all, aspects of their culture,
right down to what I have referred to as the deeper core levels of
culture—those values and principles that themselves structure the world-
view of the various peoples.
The key point is that, in showing that historically Aboriginal
peoples were willing to share what now they might express an interest in
protecting from outside forces, one does not reveal any lack of interest
in maintaining exclusive control and use of the element of Aboriginal
culture in question.  Historically (and to this day—so we could say, in a
sense, traditionally) Aboriginal communities did not think of the sharing
of a “culturally significant legend” as putting this legend into the “public
domain.”
One must be aware of the general principles of social or ethical
conduct that underlie many, if not all, Aboriginal communities.  Most
Aboriginal communities would, once at ease with the person who shows
an interest in learning about their culture, be willing to share their lives,
and the structure that gives those lives meaning.  This would not be seen
as putting the knowledge transmitted into a public arena, so that it could
then be accessed by any other individual with the slightest interest in
hearing the story, or witnessing the ritual.  The assumption would have
been that the person hearing the story, or witnessing the ritual, would
assume the same responsibilities as “anyone else” (i.e., either any other
community member, or any other Aboriginal person) in the same
situation.  This is how the community-based structures in place in
Aboriginal societies are too easily exploited by outside forces.  I will
return to this point in the conclusion, for it shows both how one could
successfully argue before a Canadian court that historically Aboriginal
reflect Western culture, it would seem, in this sort of circumstance, that the fact that the Aboriginal
people would not have to claim this right absent its interactions with Western forces would not
engage this concern.
A second factor can be considered which, I suggest, makes this complication potentially less
significant.  Regardless of the fact that the impugned right “crystallizes” from the interaction of an
Aboriginal people and Western influences, a means exists by which one could argue that the people
had such a right prior to contact.  The nature of this right can be captured in a counterfactual claim
which could have been uttered at the time of contact:
If it were to be the case that an individual or community external to our society were not
capable of acting, or willing to act, respectfully in relation to this story (respecting, for
instance, the conditions for appropriate retelling), then this individual or community
would not be granted  access to this story.
Regardless of the fact that prior to contact an Aboriginal community would have been unlikely to
have encountered the sort of disrespect in relation to its intellectual products it might suffer post-
contact, the right to the exclusive control and use of a central story could still have found a
meaningful form of expression.
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peoples had an interest in the exclusive control and use of culturally
significant legends (and the like), and how any protection the Canadian
legal and political system could offer would be unwanted and
unnecessary.65
The next element of the Van der Peet test is that of continuity.
The Court held that this requirement does not call for a simple temporal
continuity, as if Aboriginal peoples today had to demonstrate an
unbroken historical chain reaching back to pre-contact times.  Rather,
the aim is to protect only those elements of Aboriginal culture which are
contiguous with the same sorts of elements at pre-contact.  This sort of
conception of “continuity” is rather problematic, but the problems need
not concern us here.  Since the interest is in seeing just what protection
might be available in relation to those culturally significant legends
which are, ex hypothesi, linked to the traditional narratives told in pre-
contact times, problems with determining just what sort of link is
envisioned need not detain us.
The need to demonstrate that the claimed Aboriginal right is
intimately related to an element of the Aboriginal community that is
integral to their existence is central to the Van der Peet test.  One would
imagine that this can be shown in relation to the culturally significant
legends in question more easily than with, say, subsistence fishing.  The
question to ask is whether the Aboriginal people in question would be
who they are without the particular element of their culture in question.
Since we are considering an element of a people’s life-world that is at
the very core of their traditional identity, this would seem to be a fairly
easily hurdle to clear.
The potential problems that arise are the same as were noted in
relation to the “contact-point” element of the test.  Specifically they have
to do with the way the claim itself would have to be worded.  The
element of the Aboriginal culture in question that is integral to their
identity is the narrative itself, while the claim to a right would have to be
couched in terms of the exclusive control or use of this narrative.  Would
traditionally (here we are talking temporally, at pre-contact) Aboriginal
peoples have been interested in asserting exclusive control over what we
today identify as culturally significant legends?  Or, and here is the real
65 Crudely put, there is an inversion of the rights/responsibilities relation at work in many
Aboriginal societies: rather than posit rights that then impose duties, a society posits responsibilities
that may, in cases of failure to comply, lead to the assertion of rights.  Operating in concert with this
inversion is the difference between rights based on the individual and rights that are communally
determined.  See Cultural Study, supra note 6.
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problem with the decision in Van der Peet, is the perceived need for such
control only on the scene today as a result of European influence?
In Van der Peet the Court held that Aboriginal claims which only
have currency as the result of European influence cannot be thought of
as “Aboriginal,” and so are not going to fall under the umbrella of
protection offered by section 35.  This is a key part of their ruling, for in
most of the cases that reach the higher courts the dispute has been, and
continues to be, about such things as commercial fishing, an activity
which the Crown has by and large successfully argued is an enterprise
Aboriginal peoples only engage in as the result of European influence
(which in these cases amounts to the introduction of a market economy,
clear division of labour, and an economy of scale.66)
One could make a powerful argument to distinguish the
commercial cases from the sort of situation we are imagining.  The
European influence in the case of culturally significant legends has been
of two kinds.  First, we have the situation of appropriation—of
European colonists taking such things as narratives, artworks,
ceremonies, and the like, and using them either to make a direct profit,
or to make careers out of a “study” of these.  Second, we have the
introduction of the “purely” economic aspect to the situation, as
Aboriginal culture becomes a commodity to be bought and sold.  Both of
these influences have been decidedly negative, the first involving what is
nearly universally perceived to be a great deal of disrespect, 67 the second
bringing in the notion that Europeans have been able, from their
position of dominance, to treat Aboriginal culture as property.
The sort of protection we are interested in exploring in this
discussion, however, is not centred on the commercial factor, for we are
not considering in this context protection of the sort which would
66 Even in those cases where something more than small-scale fishing has been found to be
protected as an Aboriginal right, a quick reading of the decision will reveal that the commercial
factor comes in to limit the scope of the fishing practice.  In R. v. Jones (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 421
(Prov. Div.), for example, while commercial fishing for Band sustenance was held to be protected as
an Aboriginal (or treaty) right, this could not, the court went on, be equated to commercial fishing
for profit.  The key to such a finding is in the characterization of the impugned right (and, I would
suggest, an enlightened court struggling with constraints imposed by stare decisis).
67 The amount of disrespect felt depends on whether the events that surround the
appropriation include dishonesty and deceit.  In the case of more “innocent” appropriation (as
when a scholar “takes” a narrative and writes an abstract thesis exploring its meaning) some may
excuse the taking, and some may see this as not only harmless but flattering.  Too often, however,
the scholar obtained the narrative by deceit, making it seem to the informants that he or she was
only interested in personal enlightenment, or in spreading the message contained in the narrative to
a small body of other interested individuals.  The principle of sharing would lead the informants
into an act the community might later regret.
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legitimize and support a powerful Aboriginal commercial interest,
creating space for the expansion of exploitation of such things as
creation stories (by Aboriginal “owners” and not outside elements).  As
has been argued throughout this discussion, those aspects of the
traditional Aboriginal culture which, from within the Aboriginal
community, are seen as worthy of protection are best conceived
of—from this very same traditional world-view—as requiring protection
from any commercial exploitation, no matter who might be the
beneficiary.
This is a point at which some degree of post-colonial mentality
appears to be needed by Canadian courts.  The claim before a Canadian
court must be couched, recall, as a claim to the exclusive control and use
of culturally significant legends.  This, I suggest, would be to transfer
control to the Aboriginal community, though the control itself will not
translate in the Aboriginal context into the sort of commodity-regulation
powers that a Western world-view would envision.
The Canadian legal system is called upon, then, to affirm nothing
more than the right of Aboriginal communities to control, as they see fit,
the protection of their “intellectual products,” which includes such
culturally significant legends as creation stories.  Once this control is
recognized and affirmed, the Canadian apparatus must not interfere,
even when the control the communities exercise does not lead to a viable
marketplace of Aboriginal intellectual products, but rather the
construction of a wall around the citadel of culture—those core
principles and values which give meaning to the “art” that can be so
highly praised by outside markets.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Under the Van der Peet test it is quite conceivable that an
Aboriginal community could argue that it has a right to the exclusive
control and use of such things as culturally significant legends.  Whether
a particular people actually could convince a court that some such right
was an Aboriginal right, and that it warranted protection under section
35 of the Constitution Act, cannot be said ahead of time, for much would
depend on the sympathies of the bodies hearing the arguments and
seeing and hearing the evidence.68
68 I would, if space permitted, argue that the Van der Peet test was designed to drastically
narrow the scope of Aboriginal rights that will be granted protection under s. 35, but that the role of
the judge is so important in relation to just this sort of test that nearly anything is possible (at least
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I have attempted to weave into the application of the Canadian
legal tests the thread of a deeper discussion that trails out of the second
section of this article.  The subtext concerns the usefulness of the
Canadian legal system in this context.  Even if a court was to hold that
some such right was to be accorded protection as an Aboriginal right,
what would be the outcome “on the ground?”
Imagine once again that a hypothetical First Nation went to
Canadian courts seeking protection from what it perceives to be the
inappropriate use of a culturally significant legend.  While I have argued
that this First Nation might “win” the legal contest, what, besides the
court remedies available, would follow such a victory?  Might we see
legislation that attempted to control the actions of those outside forces
alluded to throughout this article?  What would this legislation attempt
to regulate?  Would there be legislation, falling loosely under the rubric
of intellectual property, which dealt with the control and use of
“culturally significant legends?”69
There are, however, two problems with such an eventuality.
First, recall that the harm the Aboriginal community suffers at the hands
of culture-thieves is not a result of the outsiders’ “taking possession” of
the significant artifacts, but in their disrespectful attitude toward the
meanings the artifacts hold for the community.  Any legislation that
would assist Aboriginal communities should be limited to efforts to assist
not in the creation of an Aboriginal marketplace of ideas, but in the
creation of a wall of secrecy around Aboriginal culture, one which the
Aboriginal communities could open and close as they see fit.
Second, it must be kept in mind that Aboriginal communities are
best situated, and best able, to control the dissemination of culturally
significant information. This is already being controlled and regulated.
By and large the mistakes made in the past by communities and
individuals have been—and continue to be—used as lessons in
themselves (as is traditional).  No longer do communities so quickly
warm up to the anthropologist pulling into the reserve with the claim
that he—using the masculine seems appropriate—just wants to “get to
know how you live and play.”
with the lower courts).  See Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue (1997), 134 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.)
for an example of how far a sympathetic judge can push the Van der Peet test.
69 This is along the lines, perhaps, of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage
Protection Act, 1984, Aust. Acts 1984, No. 79.  As part of a recent review of the Act, issues
surrounding how to deal with “secret/sacred” information are explored (especially c. 4, entitled,
“Respecting Customary Restrictions on Information,” online: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/
rsjproject/rsjlibrary/evatt/chapter4.html> (date accessed: 15 February 1999).  The review is
informative, and the recommendations, by and large, enlightened.  See also Cultural Study, supra
note 6.
1998] Aboriginal Rights, Culture, and Protection 483
What one finds within Aboriginal communities today is not the
result of the creation of a new set of institutional controls, for the same
principles and structures that have existed for generations are behind all
this.  The difference is that Aboriginal communities now know that by
and large Europeans will not respect the teachings and that they do
operate according to very different principles and values.  The
traditional way of maintaining control over the significant teachings can
accommodate this unfortunate fact, and, even more importantly, must
accommodate this fact.  The principle of sharing still predominates, but
it only comes into play when the community knows quite thoroughly the
motives behind the actions of the outsider-on-our-doorstep.
But what of the problem of the misappropriation of culturally
significant elements of Aboriginal culture which has and continues to
take place?  Is this not to ignore the inability of Aboriginal communities
to adequately manage their intellectual products?  If they could do so,
the naysayers charge, there would not be the growing perception that a
problem exists.  It may be comforting to know that some communities
have reacted to the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal dynamic with inventive
measures ensuring that sacred and valuable knowledge remains
protected from outside commercial exploitation.  Clearly, however, there
remains much to be done in most regions, for many Aboriginal people
decry the absence of means by which their cultures can be protected
from outside interference and disrespect.
It is not just, though, that any protection the Canadian system
could provide is unnecessary—it is also that it is inappropriate and ill-
advised.  I have suggested in this article that the Canadian side of the
equation could provide, as supplementary assistance, some sort of
prohibition on the use of such things as culturally significant legends by
those who are not members of the community that traditionally would
have had an interest in regulating the use of the legends in question.  But
this way of solving such problems is typically Canadian, and atypically
Aboriginal.  The appropriate solution to the problem traditionally
speaking—note that it is not seen as the same problem on both sides of
the equation—involves working towards a greater sense of responsibility.
This is not something that works externally upon the individual moral
agent (as the legal structures of the West seem constrained to do, given
the underlying conceptualization of the individual and his or her
autonomy and rights), but something that builds up from the inside.
The solution to the problem of outside appropriation and
disrespect is to limit the dissemination of cultural knowledge to those
who come searching with proper motives.  This is, as I noted above,
already the order of the day in many contexts of which I am aware.  For
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many First Nations, what I have referred to as the culture of a people,
the core principles and values that go into structuring the world-view of
the people in question, are not in any great danger of being
misappropriated.  Traditional structures are working at the task of
protecting the use of traditional Aboriginal culture, and any assistance
by the Canadian legal or political system would be unnecessary.  In other
contexts, where the structures and institutions are not in place, where
there are little or no community means by which to adequately protect
this sacred information, the answer is not, once again, to coordinate a
response with the Canadian legal or political system.  Rather, it is to
continue work, from within, on the regeneration of these structures and
institutions.  In these contexts the supplementation by a Western
framework is inappropriate.
